Kleptocracy and Its Relation to Economic Performance: The Case Study of Congo

DATE PUBLISHED
January 5, 2018
SECTION
Articles

Abstract

Researchers have attributed the low productivity growth rates of African agricultural sector to many factors including weather patterns, growing conditions, institutions and other economic factors; however, it is reasonable to assume that individual leaders’ decisions can impede the economic growth and development in weakly institutionalized countries. This early public policy “Zairianization” has impaired the economic performance of the Congo. This case study illustrates such effect on Congo’s agricultural sector. Results suggest that the total loss tapped $160.34 billion from 1974 to 2009 with an annual average loss of $5.5 billion (28 percent of GDP). The loss ranges from $3.02 billion to $ 5.5 billion.

Keywords

Congo, economic performance, synthetic control methods, kleptocracy

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Author Details

Onyumbe Enumbe B. Lukongo