An Expected Value Analysis Of The Role Of Secret Shoppers In Combating Petty Corruption
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One common form of public-sector petty corruption is the extortion performed by low-level bureaucrats against citizens when they request (require) facilitating payments to provide needed approvals that they control as part of their job function. This paper examines the effect of “secret shoppers” in combating petty corruption. We first develop a model of a single play interaction between a citizen and a bureaucrat to uncover the condition under which the citizen will pay the
requested facilitating payment. The model is then extended to include the possibility that the citizen may in fact be another government official with the authority to sanction the bureaucrat. This model is used to determine what factors may be taken induce the bureaucrat to not request facilitating payments. We show that both the size of a monetary sanction and the perceived probability that a citizen is in fact a government official with the authority to sanction the bureaucrat’s behavior affect the propensity to extort. We conclude with policy implications and suggestions for further research.
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